Trying to create my own version of a "unified field theory," I undertook to relate social science perspectives and methods to research in the field of history and to find out how economic and political systemic patterns interrelate with symbols and values. In an exploratory mood, I delivered the paper below to the annual conference of the American Historical Association in Boston, Massachusetts in December, 1970. At that time the paper was entitled "Urban History and Comparative National History—Some Common Questions and Points of Congruence." It was written for advanced scholars doing research in the field of urban history.

Geography, the Social Sciences and Urban History

Introduction

The following presentation is the beginning of an inventory of what we do not yet know in a sufficiently detailed or systematic way about the relationship between cities and larger polities. For example, what were the most salient systemic changes among or between North African and Near Eastern cities under the successive rules of the Byzantine, Arab, and Ottoman empires? How were these patterns transformed again under 20th-century political circumstances? The problem is how to go about answering such questions in more probative and illuminating ways. The first step is to ask more questions.

Some historians such as Eric Lampard and Sam Bass Warner use social science methods in their analysis of cities. Geographers have long been concerned with history, as the work of Rhoads Murphey amply testifies. However, the more sophisticated types of social science analysis have not yet been applied to pre-19th century urban history. Most social scientists lack the historical knowledge to do it, and most historians of the ancient, medieval, and early modern world (even if they are economic or urban historians) disdain the methodology. In the minds of many American curriculum-makers, urban history means the 19th- and 20th-century history of American cities. Broader world perspectives are left out; cities are viewed as problems rather than as the creators and sustainers of civilizations; yet in almost all parts of the world, cities were there before states were, and played a vital role not only in the state-making process but also in the articulation of the myths and rituals necessary to sustain any form of polity. We must make the frame of reference for our research both spatially and temporally global, and we must take a more ecumenical approach to method.

Urban history needs to coalesce with world systems history for a while; then we can return to fuller humanistic expression of how individual people have lived in cities as their life-space. Systems analysis need not be obeisant to the institutional and technological net in which we are embedded, but a means of freeing ourselves from that net—so that we may rise above it—to restore to our selves and to our culture (which now is an urban culture) a greater integralness and greater self-command—which is to say a new style; to restore to our civic

life some of the qualities the Greeks meant by the term *polis.* In methodology there is—I believe—both an ethic and an aesthetic.

The Spatial Reach of Political and City Systems

The first question is whether the spatial reach of coherent systems of cities in the past coincided with the geographic space of the polities to which those cities "belonged." Over what space did cities cohere as a related system? Perhaps the system of cities sprawled outside the walls of the polity. Or perhaps the polity contained more than one set of city systems.

From a static view, anything was a whole which operated in quasi-independence of its environment. However, from a dynamic view (which is to say an historical view) wholes had to be considered in their relation to environment. To the extent that a system was incomplete, not sated, it reached out into its environment for completion; to the extent that it had a superfluity of parts, it had sent those parts out into the environment (e.g., a nation-state sent or received migrants and resources.) Out of this process came dynamism and history itself. The analytical question was, what are whole systems and what was their environment? The question could be applied to the systems of cities and political forms of the past.

Some Social Science Measurements

Economic geographers rank cities on the basis of their comparative population. Mark Jefferson first presented what he called the "law of the primate city" in 1939.[1] An index of primacy may be estimated by dividing the largest city's population by that of the second largest (or by the sum of the population of all those next in rank in the hierarchy). It used to be thought that where there was one very large primate city, with several intermediate cities some distance from it both in terms of geographic space and size, this meant the economy was predominately agricultural. Paris has long been, of course, a classic example of a primate city. A related measure is the so-called rank size rule of lognormality, where the population of any city multiplied by its rank is a constant. Geographers used to believe that rank-size regularity was characteristic of cities in large polities with long traditions of urbanization and a functionally integrated industrial or post-industrial economy, such as that of the United States, and, in 1970, Berry and Horton still conceded that this was often the case.[2] However, geographers and economists now question whether population size rankings are automatic clues to the state of a country's economic development or its degree of urbanization.[3] Berry and Garrison argued in 1958 that lognormal distribution indicates a condition of entropy, defined as a circumstance in which the forces affecting the distribution are many and act randomly within the context of growth propor-

tionate to size of city. Nevertheless, ranking methods may still be valid as an indicator of where the edges of a system of cities lie.

Analyzing the distribution of cities can tell us whether or not the set is appropriate (that is, whether or not it makes up a whole system) or whether a geographically broader or narrower set should be chosen, though care should be taken to explore alternative explanations. A normal rank size distribution suggests a single functionally interacting urban system. If all cities within a polity fall into such a distribution, it is safe to assume that the parameters of the system of cities and the boundaries of the polity coincide. If the distribution has a flat top, there may be several relatively independent regions with little functional integration. (On the other hand, countries such as Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands and Japan may have several large specialized cities which are complementary rather than duplicative.) If there is a steep slope between rank one and two, possibly the largest city may serve a much larger area than that encompassed by the cities in the plotted distribution or may have done so in the recent past, as in the case of a former capital of a former empire or the chief city of a country recently politically or economically colonial. (However, a small country may have a primate city with such economies of scale that cities of intermediate size are not necessary.) Primate and rank size patterns are not mutually exclusive. All cities but the top one can be and usually are rank size.

Usually the ranking method is applied to contemporary cities, but it can also readily be used to analyze urban size distribution for any area in any part of the past for which statistics are available. Thus a series of rank orders could be established, on the basis of estimates, beginning as far back as the Hellenistic empire and showing city system changes over time. These in turn could be compared with political boundary changes over time.

For example, while the area of the Carolingian empire and its successors became and remained for some time far less urbanized than it had been under the Romans, the areas under Arab dominance were becoming more urban than ever but with the major cities focused on inland deserts and caravan routes while some seaports dwindled, and soon settlements burgeoned on the Dnieper, the Black Sea, and even the Volga.[4] An urban hierarchy analysis could be made of these successive gravity shifts and their systemic coherent set of cities, where and how the boundaries overlapped or faded into a no-man's land, with what effect on major military political jurisdictional changes (and vice versa).[5] What were the city systems changes that preceded and followed the unification of Italy and of Germany in 1870? What were the changes in city systems that underlay the breaking up of large polities into smaller ones, such as in the Austro-Hungarian Empire? We know the facts in all these cases, but we do not know them systematically enough.

To jump to the modern period, to what extent do the cities of Western Europe make up a single system? Or would it be better to say that the cities of the Rhine-Ruhr-Ranstad complex form one system cutting across a wing of Germany, northern and northeastern France, and the Low Countries, with the rest of the cities of France and the eastern part of West Germany forming separate systems of cities?[6] The Rhine area, of course, has been a buffer zone, with cities as a factor in that role, since ancient Roman times and earlier. The recent interdependence of the region seems different from the patterns of the past—more of a core than an edge. Major urbanization in France has been occurring at the northern and northeastern borders. Foreign industry has been moving into Alsace at an accelerated pace, and numerous French workers commute across the Alsatian-German border. The whole weight of German population has shifted toward the Rhine. The ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam are booming in spectacular new ways. Not only does all this indicate urban patterns ready to take up where the Renaissance Rhine cities, Flanders and the Hanseatic League left off, but also the core of a whole new kind of political state.

If city systems sprawl beyond nations, at what point did this happen? How do the city-systemic patterns bring about changes in political jurisdictional boundaries or in the informal quasi-governmental structures that modify formal national jurisdictional patterns? What reasons can systems theory give for why the Hanseatic League did not evolve into a state, considering the subsequent history of the 19th-century Zollverein and the current tendency to view the European Common Market as a prelude to eventual political organization? What are the legacy and effect of past urban patterns upon new political forms? What are the urban pre-conditions for integration of nation-states into larger units? To what extent do the cities of the United States and Western Europe form a unity so that John Kennedy's talk of an Atlantic Community had more than hope behind it? How does all this relate to the changes going on in eastern Europe and the Middle East?

Since the focus of urban hierarchy analysis is on population size rather than on relationships in space, some of these questions might better be answered with economic geography's techniques for analyzing what are variously called (with varying nuances of meaning) city umlands, hinterlands, trade areas, urban fields, regional networks, economic landscapes, or urban spheres of influence.

A number of geographers have amplified upon and added corrections to the pioneer work of Walter Christaller, analyzing the hexagon patterns of the service and market areas of southern German cities. R. E. Dickinson has summarized their findings as follows: "The range of service of a commodity (the geographic limit of its collection or delivery) depends on the degree of its specialization and the frequency with which it has to be provided or purchased and the money involved in buying it." Smaller service centers (i.e., towns and villages) tend to

have one zone around them; larger ones have a series of zones at varying distances from the center. "The outer range of distribution and collection of goods around a center constitutes its trade area. The result is a hierarchy of centers, graded according to degrees of concentration of centralized services, which in considerable measure may be reflected in the size of their population."[7]

There is an inverse relationship between the size of a given class of centers and the number of centers in the class. Spatial distribution of urban centers as seats of central services varies depending on whether the town's primary role is a marketing one in a relatively simple agrarian region, or whether the urban center is a break-in-bulk point along a trade route or other transportation path (in which case it is a link between two or more regions); whether the center is primarily for governmental administration and was planned systematically in an area before or coincident with settlement (as in China, 16th-century Hispanic America, or Australia), or whether the town or city performs a specialized function, often dependent on such accidents of geography as mineral springs, waterfalls, or coal deposits. Where the market factor is paramount, and the total landscape is uniform, cities may arrange themselves evenly in hexagon patterns as they did in southern Germany.

The size and placement of the city will vary depending on whether it is a local retailing center, a regional wholesaling center, or a center for more complex and widespread exchange. If the traffic factor is paramount (if the city is a place where goods and/or people are unloaded and reloaded for further transport), then the pattern is apt to be linear along traffic routes, as was the case with north German cities and cities along the Rhône Valley, rather than dispersed at the corners of hexagons. The administrative factor has strongly influenced French as well as Chinese and Latin American city distribution. The Soviet Union has been able to put cities where it decides to. Regional capitals tend to make satellites. Special-function cities, such as single product manufacturing centers or spas, are irregularly distributed. Certain cities are foci for the others as centers for generalized control and leadership.[8]

Central place theory has been widely tested and, with modifications, generally accepted, though there are doubters here, too.[9] Christaller and some of his followers have tended to think in terms of cellular models for the lowest level units of urban hierarchies, each regional cell having a single center to and from which goods and people flow. The hinterlands of cities thus perceived scarcely overlap. Other analysts have emphasized how greatly hinterlands vary for different goods and services, so that some of a city's many different hinterlands may be as extensive as the whole national economy and society.[10] If this is true of national systems of cities, it is certainly also true of supranational patterns. The same city may have some hinterlands that are no further than the watershed or milkshed, but at the same time have others that fling a filament over the

whole globe. The pattern looks different if the framework from the outset is taken to be not a single urban region but the whole nation as a general ecological field. Central place or city-and-region theorists usually take the broader political parameters of the nation-state as a given and seldom try to investigate how changing urban field patterns or systems patterns may help create, dissolve, enlarge, or reshape political parameters. In other words, the question here, as well as for population size ranking, is not only what kind of a system cities form within an already given polity but also how do particular polities or new kinds of polities with their city-systems emerge out of earlier larger or smaller city-system configurations. And how did they do so in the past.[11]

Cities in the Process of Political Territorial Expansion

Although the relationship of cities to the process of political territorial expansion is a standard field in geography and a standard subject for histories using more traditional historical methods, historians have done little work on all aspects of the process or on the reciprocal effects of city-system changes and the formation of nation-states.

We are frequently told how larger political entities were created by expansion out from a core area, the Roman Empire out from Rome and Italy, imperial Russia out from Moscow and Muscovy, France out from the Île de France and Paris, and so forth. How was the ultimate structure of the final political unit different if it was not created in this way but rather by expansion out from a string of seacoast cities such as those on the North American seaboard? In systemic terms, what was the effect when the original core was superseded by another core, as Saxon Winchester superseded Roman London and then was superseded by medieval London?

And what was the role of non-core cities in the development of nations? Cities were there a long time before modern states were formed; medieval towns began to appear along the great commercial waterways of Europe as early as the 7th century. Large numbers of the modern cities of Europe were established by the 13th century, often on sites of old Roman cities, which in turn were often on or near old Celtic sites. Being there first, and having won their privileges in struggles against bishops, princes, kings, or emperors, the cities were for a long time not disposed to give up autonomy unless they had to. Rather, they played pope against emperor, emperor against bishop, prince against emperor, king against lord, or lord against bishop to win as many new privileges as possible. As Clarke has said about the early Middle Ages, "The degree of emancipation secured by the town was invariably in inverse proportion to the degree of territorial unity achieved by the prince."[12] After the fall of Frederick II, imperial cities won the most, and the most lasting, freedom because of the weakness of emperors. Wherever princes needed cities as outposts of conquest or as ploys in trade rivalry, or

wherever kings needed the burghers' money, cities struck a hard bargain. Does this mean then that urbanism was an impediment to the growth of the state?

Not so. Chartered cities with their special freedoms and their special markets and market law, so comparatively free from the feudal tangle of seigneurial rights, were veritable models of what the state was to become. They were miniature or trial states; in northern Italy and in Germany many of them were states. Moreover, as asylums for serfs, they hastened the demise of the manorial system; as sources of the money which kings used to hire mercenaries, they hastened the demise of the feudal system.[13]

Inasmuch as they copied their constitutions from one another (in Germany using Lübeck and Magdeburg as models; in England, following London, Oxford, Nottingham, or Northampton; in southern France following Montauban and in northern France imitating Breteuil of Normandy), to this extent they hastened the spread of uniform law.[14]

As long-distance trade centers, they encouraged the development of a sense of space separate from human particularities, a space to be traversed by strangers, a space having reality in and of itself. In Germany, corridors of passage between cities became outliers for consolidating principalities. They were used, for example, by the Rhineland Palatinate to expand its territory at the expense of its neighbors.[15] In France in the late 12th and early 13th centuries, kings became responsible for issuing safeconducts. French burghers were usually given only limited freedom and no autonomous self-government.[16] Thus the towns could not have been a major obstacle to the growth of the state. Although a number of English ecclesiastical and secular lords created boroughs for easy policing, protection and taxing of trade, William the Conqueror made himself the ultimate authorizer and guarantor of English cities.[17]

French cities never did coin money, enforce high justice, or form associations the way the German cities did. By the 14th century, English towns were under one money system and, except for Lancaster, one system of weights and measures.[18] Sometimes by force, sometimes by the town's default, kings gradually assumed more political control over towns, beginning with the chartering and regulation of craft guilds. The cities and towns were, then, vehicles for the extension of royal or princely power and for the spread of uniform national law, as well as being "natural points of crystallization for the territorial state."[19]

These facts are all familiar to historians and are threaded through standard textbooks, but no one has taken the trouble to put together all the pieces into a really thoroughgoing comparative analysis of the role of cities in the formation of European nation-states. Not only to compare how burghers in different parliaments furthered or hindered the overall process of emerging statehood, but also to compare the relevant sociological and economic changes within and between towns.

When one thinks about the large numbers of traders and financial agents from Lombardy, the Hanseatic cities and other places stationed in colonies in major cities all over Renaissance Europe,[20] one wonders why the forces of particularism were so strong that the cosmopolitan cities of Lyon, Antwerp, or London did not become capitals of a new kind of "international" order. Territorial parochialism seems to have intensified at the very time communication over long distances was increasing the fastest, perhaps because greater contact increased awareness of regional and cultural differences. There seems to be some analogy between that phenomenon, the regionalist or nationalist particularism of the 19th century, and the numerous examples of minority group self-awareness and particularism in the United States and the world today. In each case cities played a role that has not yet been fully understood.

It is commonly thought that the Mongol conquest of China was the conquest of a sedentary people having an agrarian-urban civilization by a non-urban nomadic people. Essentially nomadic Mongols did conquer the north, but after an interval, partially urbanized and Sinicized Mongols, with Chinese help, conquered the south.[21] The Arabs were also nomads, but recall that Mecca was a trading center at the time Islam first began there. Islam from its inception was connected with commerce and industry and therefore was urban in base and ideology, and city-camps were a major device for Islamic conquest.[22] How did city-system change in each case precede or follow political and military change?

Cities and Political Frontiers

Polities have boundaries, and systems of cities have boundaries. Yet boundary theory is one of the most neglected areas of political geography, and scarcely figures in the analytics of most historians. Social scientists seldom couch their theories in such a way as to explain the spatial parameters within which phenomena are confined. They take spatial parameters as given, for example, in macroeconomics (which is one reason why it is difficult for economists to develop urban and regional economic theory), or they ignore the spatial issue altogether, as most sociologists do.[23]

On the surface, it would seem that the barriers of physical geography and the forces of tradition have played such a strong part in influencing national boundary locations that cities have been relatively uninfluential. Many of the seemingly inexplicable boundaries of Europe were in ancient times impenetrable forests or marshlands.[24] Vaughn Cornish found the language line in 1920s Belgium was closely related to the Roman road dividing Christians from heathens in the 5th century.[25] The partitions at the end of the Carolingian period marked out areas in Europe that have, in a rough way, been the basis of political divisions ever since. In many respects the outlines of the present states system of western Europe were already perceptible in the 9th and 10th centuries.[26] Since

towns were only beginning to be re-established then, and were insignificant in size or number, one might conclude that cities and their hinterlands have had very little indeed to do with the placement of political boundaries. Smaller political subdivisions such as the counties in England or the provincial regions in France go back an astonishingly long time,[27] and have persisted through major changes in the configurations and fortunes of cities.

Yet there is also evidence that cities have played a strong role in the establishment and maintenance of political frontiers. One thinks of the Roman *castra* along the Rhine, the towns that grew out of the forts in the marshlands begun by Charlemagne, the stronghold towns in Alfred's Wessex, the city plantings the Teutonic Knights used to conquer what became the Mark of Brandenburg, the city plantings of Edward I in north and west Wales after 1284 as a way of holding that newly conquered territory, or the new towns of the Spanish conquistadors.[28] In Germany, towns were the normal means by which emperors and princes defended and developed their territories.[29] Over 300 towns were planted in Brandenburg, Pomerania, Silesia, and Bohemia in a succession of frontiers against the Slavs.[30] Peking was originally a remote fortress. Detroit grew at a site originally marked by Fort Pontchartrain (1701) as a defense post in feudal holdings. Many an American town began around a fort.

This we know, but what about city trade and its effect on boundaries? Has there been a point when the expansion of a city helped cause the political boundaries of the nation itself to alter? What were the trade hinterlands of frontier cities of the past: Regensburg, under the Roman Empire or in the crucial years between 1000 and 1200; Novgorod as a free city; New Amsterdam or St. Louis? How did those hinterlands change, in precisely measured spatial and frequency-of-interaction terms, as population receded (in the case of the Roman frontier) or spread into other regions? At what point and in what patterns, as their hinterlands changed, did the cities transform from frontier trade and defense posts to something else? What relationship did this have to the broader fate of empire or nation?

The original frontiers marked by many cities were later superseded. What happened to cities, analyzed in a comparative and systematic way, as they were bypassed and superseded in the boundary-expansion process? We need a history of all the losers.[31] Boundaries, of course, were late in being stabilized. Most of the national states of modern Europe had taken form around nuclei by the early 15th century, but most of them had imprecise boundaries until 1815. We know the political-historical details of how modern boundary decisions were made, but we do not know how changes in city systems preceded, followed, or accompanied changes in political boundaries and forms, and in what patterns. We have Franklin L. Ford's interesting *Strasbourg in Transition, 1648-1789*,[32] a case study of the effects of change in political boundary. We have witnessed the

changes in size and form of Riga, Danzig, Hamburg, and various Polish cities as their hinterlands have been foreshortened or expanded by political boundary change.[33] We can see for ourselves what has happened to Berlin and East German cities since 1946. But again the need is for a general comparative study.

We need more thorough studies of cities and economic regions that fall on two sides of an international boundary. People move back and forth to work daily and freely across Belgium's northern and southern frontiers in economic regions that traverse national divisions, as they formerly moved between South Baden, Alsace, and Switzerland before 1917,[34] and as they also move between Alsace and Germany today. What has been the relationship of Detroit to Windsor or El Paso to Juarez? What has been the comparative history of boundary straddling?

There has been a tendency in recent years, because of bridges and tunnels, for both sides of rivers, bays, or estuaries to be populated, where formerly only one side was settled. Note, for example, the present more balanced settlement along the Volga, the Rhine, on Long Island and New Jersey in relation to Manhattan, on the East Bay in relation to San Francisco. What was formerly a divider has become a central hall and unifier. If this is so on a smaller scale, it may soon become true on a larger scale, of the Great Lakes, the Mediterranean, or the Atlantic Ocean even. Theories of boundary may become more "relevant" than isolationist Americans formerly believed.

Cities and the Integration of Socio-Economic-Political Systems

In alluding to political form so far, I have used the generic word "polity" because—of course—there have been city-republics, empires that were not states, states that were not empires and some that were, states that were not nations, nations that were not states, nation-states, federations, confederations, and other forms less easy to denote in a word. The central question is what difference the political form has made for the distribution and interrelationships and internal structure of cities and vice versa. How closely were cities linked to one another in an interdependent way, what were the links, and how did these interurban links reflect, match, or create the other links that held the whole political system together?

Most social science thinking about this subject has been insufficiently multi-dimensional, comparative, or historically informed. For example, political scientist Burton Witthuhn in 1969 suggested that there had been four stages of territorial integration:

1. In the initial stage, each site functioned independently of the others.
2. Next, transportation and communication links led to some economic specialization and therefore to a hierarchy of functional nodes, still mini-

mally linked. Because of the rudimentary nature of the specialization and the links, there were a number of independent territorial foci.

3. In the modernizing stage, people related by telegraph, phone or radio and by transportation paths that varied in speed and cost. The new distance metrics were based on time and perception, not just space. With the new technology came more areal specialization and hence a reordering of urban hierarchies. At the same time—paradoxically—boundaries became as important as infrastructure in determining political cohesion.

4. In the latest, integrated, stage the central problem is one of building cultural and political consensus into the larger bounded framework where economic integration is already highly advanced.[35]

This theory rests on the assumption that agricultural surpluses available for exchange and hence incipient economic specialization led to the development of towns as exchange places or nodes of integration. This is consistent with Lynn Whyte's statement that the creation of agricultural surpluses through improved techniques was the major factor producing early medieval European towns.[36] However, it ignores the cases of some of the great empires, such as China, where urbanism was primarily an administrative phenomenon.

Also, the theory fails to distinguish between integration and cohesion. Integration (in the sense of frequent transactions) has existed without a state, as it did between northern Italy, parts of Germany, parts of France, and Flanders in the Renaissance, and as it does in contemporary international regionalism, though some rudimentary form of state is necessary to provide for safety of passage and necessary uniformity and reliability of the mechanisms of exchange. In the future, worldwide mass communication and hence more uniformity of symbol systems may provide cohesion without a state. Cohesion may occur where there is a low degree of economic integration, as in the case of imperial China held together by a common culture and a Confucian-trained bureaucracy. In the case of the future, the disappearance of the territorial state in its familiar forms will probably be attended by the substitution of huge regional or worldwide corporations together with vocational organizations and other syndicalism. In this case, a level of non-state cohesion will be matched by a high level of socio-economic integration.

Nevertheless, throughout most of human history the state has been an important factor in providing cohesion. Witthuhn suggests that territorial boundedness (an important aspect of what we mean by state) occurred after there was a fairly high degree of economic integration. Hans O. Schmitt, building on the ideas of Karl Deutsch,[37] and relying too narrowly on evidence pertaining to the contemporary problem of European unification, has suggested that changes in the boundaries of an economy are established by capital flows (especially direct investment), currency unification, and labor migration. The stages of economic

integration proceed from free trade area to custom union to common market to full integration. At a particular stage in economic unification, the state emerges, within which people develop a sense of nationality through communication flows, most of which are economically motivated. Since economic boundaries, boundaries of the state, and national boundaries evolve semi-sequentially, they sometimes do not coincide. A fully developed integration, Schmitt has argued, leads to their coinciding.[38]

My own research suggests that reliance on the state for cohesion in the past occurred when one system of integrating economy and society, such as feudalism or colonial mercantilism, was breaking down and another one had not yet taken shape. The concept of state was most important to Americans in the first half of the 19th century. In the early decades after the Constitution was written, the American political system held together more because of an underlying social network than because of the abstract concept of state. It was not until the geographic territory of the country began to expand drastically between 1803 and 1848 that the idea of state became all important as a basis for national cohesion. Rapid territorial expansion was accompanied by rapid population spread, the addition of numerous new dispersed towns and cities to system, and the gradual breakdown of old mercantile patterns in favor of new industrial ones. If one looks for the earliest strong manifestations of the urge to state in Europe, one finds them coinciding with the breakdown of the manorial and feudal systems and the emergence of more extensive long-distance trade (i.e., new forms of integration). The idea of a modern Chinese state, adopted in 1911, but not implemented until after 1949, certainly came at a time when China was torn apart by simultaneous economic change and social disintegration. The territorial state, I would argue, has been a holding action for societies in certain stages of transformation (although the 6th, 7th, and 8th centuries in Western Europe certainly afford a contrary example of social disintegration accompanied by disintegration of state).

Cities and Economic Development

The point is that the territorial state has appeared at certain stages of socio-economic integration, correlated with changes in urban patterns, but we need to know more about when, how, and why. It is a mistake for social scientists to think that cities have developed in a linear "progress" away from non-specialization toward specialization of function and to extrapolate from that the conclusion that there has been a steady movement toward greater territorial integration.

Cities in the Roman Empire varied in their economic functions. Some specialized in government. For example, Trier, in the late 3rd and 4th centuries, owed its prosperity and size to the fact that it was the seat of the praetorian

prefect for Gaul. When Ostia sank into the sand, various Italian port cities simultaneously served Rome, each specializing in a different kind of import. None matched the position of the great, proud, more general port of Alexandria. Since Rome lived, as it were, more off the dole than off trade, for real trade Alexandria was the greater capital. The empire had its university towns, such as Athens. Jerusalem was a magnet for pilgrims. Several towns were industrial centers, such as Amiens or Bourges for wool, Tyre for oil, and so forth.[39] How did that kind of urban functional specialization compare with the functional specialization of the later Middle Ages and Renaissance, when industry focused in Florence, Ghent, and Augsburg (among others); while cities like Venice, Genoa, Bruges, and Antwerp were primarily centers for long-distance commerce; and Florence, Augsburg, Lyon, and Antwerp were centers of finance, each in a different way?[40] Since the political shape of late medieval Europe was quite different from that of the Roman Empire, did the differences in urban functional specialization reflect or affect the political shape in each case?

As modern states began to form in Western Europe, relations between cities were also changing. Long distance trade centers became relatively larger. In the first several centuries A.D., the number of towns in China was fewer than formerly, but the number of large towns was greater, so that by the 8th century 25 cities each had more than half a million.[41] Here we have two comparable situations of change in urban hierarchies; was there any clearcut parallel in economic change? And why was there so little apparent analogy in political form? Did the greater disparities in urban size indicate more urban functional specialization and therefore a greater degree of areal economic integration in each country?

Was the emergence of state mercantilism in France and England a cause or condition of changes in city size and function? If so, how was the pattern of functional specialization different from that of the late Middle Ages or the Roman Empire? Do the differences in the urban patterns of 17th- and 18th-century France and England match and explain differences in the nature and operation of mercantilism in each country?

In the paleotechnic age of steam and coal, industries favored locations on water ports, so that coal barges had easy entry, or in lowlands fed by canals and railroads, and large numbers of workers were aggregated near large urban central factories. Hence, the sudden 19th-century growth of Pittsburgh and Gary, Birmingham and Manchester, Dortmund and Essen. In the recent neotechnic age of electricity, internal combustion, and chemistry, American factories have moved to suburbs away from city centers and have even moved to comparatively rural areas in the South.

Building on von Thünen's theory of agricultural location and Weber's theory of industrial location, Lösch suggested that 19th- and 20th-century industrial

local patterns were either network in shape (e.g., bakeries), in a restricted belt (such as cotton gins), in a cluster district (such as coal), or in a punctiform place (such as collar manufacture in Troy, New York).[42]

Some towns have been dominated by large individual enterprises, such as Gary, Indiana by U.S. Steel or Dearborn, Michigan by Ford Motor Company, or Eindhoven in the Netherlands by Philips Electric. Some have been agglomerations of different enterprises.

Patterns have varied from country to country, even in the western world. Britain in the Midlands and Germany in the Ruhr Valley developed belts of specialized industry. The cities in each case tended to form a close-knit agglomeration quite different in form and function from cities elsewhere in either country. The advent of industry did not alter the traditional hexagon distribution of southern German cities very much. Textile manufacturing in 17th- and 18th-century Germany was often dispersed among countless countryside homes, with numerous small towns serving as coordinators. The much more sophisticated industries in Würtemberg today are still scattered over the countryside, with Stuttgart as a center.[43] One wonders just what influence the persistence of traditional urban locations has had on Germany's overall industrial structure, and what the structural effects have been of the deliberate decentralization of German banking after 1946, so that the management of the three leading banks was divided between Hamburg, Düsseldorf, and Frankfurt.[44]

What meaningful analogies are there between the German situation and the location of industry in the American South, by the 1950s, when parts of North Carolina and the Gulf Coast from Pensacola to Galveston had become densely industrialized with small central cities surrounded by smaller satellite communities and a considerable dispersal of workers over the open countryside.[45] In the American Midwest, cities began as centers of commerce for regional markets before they became seats of diversified industry and independent financial centers. Therefore, industry tended not to fall into the specialized cluster patterns of the British Midlands. In France, the disposition of roads and railroads reinforced the traditional pattern of provincial cities as regional capitals; when diversified industry was added to the towns it did not modify very much this traditional pattern.[46]

Urbanism, Sectionalism, and Colonialism

The analysis by Chauncey D. Harris of the 1959 population size distribution of USSR cities showed that the Ukraine might be composed of as many as five urban network regions, while Tashkent's size suggested that the whole Soviet Middle Asia, including four republics, formed one urban network; that Moscow was the right size to be the primary city for the European part but not the whole of the USSR; and that the larger cities in Asiatic Russia appeared to be centers

of relatively independent networks of cities, each separated from the others by enormous distances and often lofty mountains, great stretches of forests or vast deserts.[47] We need comparable analyses for the American South in relation to the whole United States before and after the Civil War, Prussia before and after 1870 in relation to the rest of the Reich, and—if it could be done—of the various parts of the Roman Empire before and during the barbarian invasions. Did Rome's increasing efforts to unify its empire politically, highlighted by the extension of citizenship to all provincials in the early third century and later by the administrative reforms of Diocletian, follow a pattern of greater economic integration between the cities of the empire or rather serve as an antidote to economic disintegration? Or was there no connection at all?

It is a Marxian axiom that the national state was an outgrowth of bourgeois attempts to capture markets. Some time ago, Patrick Geddes and Victor Branford argued that the centralization of France, the American Civil War, the unification of Germany and even of Italy were all due to the expansion of market areas.[48] If so, just how did the process work? Was it an expansion of market areas from diversified centers? And if so, which ones, why those, in what patterns, with what political ramifications? Or was it in some cases the expansion of market areas of specialized industries located in special places? What have been the precise links between urban-economic specialization and imperialism? We might think of the problem as a collision of hinterlands, which in turn leads either to a reaffirmation of the boundaries of the state or to a reshaping of those boundaries. Why, in urban system terms, was there reaffirmation in some cases and reshaping in others?

Industry and settlement tend to focus around or create certain centers of gravitational pull; at some points the pull between two or more centers is relatively equal. What were the relative gravity pulls between the antebellum South, England, and the North? Karl Deutsch has said: "It was one of the miscalculations of the South on the eve of the Civil War to think that King Cotton would bring Britain in on the Southern side in the Civil War. Not only was King Wheat on the other side but what was probably more important in many ways, Britain's rewarding human communications were stronger with the North than with the South."[49] How much of a factor was the possibility that the South might soon be developing a gravity pull of its own vis-à-vis the American Southwest, the Caribbean, and Mexico? Or is it more accurate to say that the South was trying to preserve its urban-economic colonial status in the face of economic trends which would have integrated it more closely into the American industrial-urban system?

Harris has suggested that perhaps we ought to think of the Far Eastern portions of the USSR as colonies rather than as integral parts of the nation. If so, how

would this differ from the urban colonialism of parts of the Roman Empire, or from the relationships of the newly colonized eastern cities of Germany to the more established parts of the 13th-century Holy Roman Empire? This raises the question of what distinctive urban patterns colonial regions have had.

The main stages of urban colonialism in Asia and sometimes other areas seem to have been as follows: 1) Before foreign colonial domination, the major cities were primarily inland, with a primate city as capital. 2) With the imposition of colonial status, great new cities were created or minor old ones rapidly expanded at seacoast or major coast-related riverport locations. These cities outweighed the old inland capitals both in size and economic influence. Often one of them became the new governmental capital. 3) After anti-colonial national independence, an attempt was made to downgrade seaport location and to upgrade inland cities. Often the capital was moved to an inland location once more.[50] During the colonial stage, railroads were built and industry located primarily to serve the needs of the external colonial power. Railroad building in China was often bitterly resisted by the Chinese.[51] One wonders how much the location of American railroads served British interests to the extent that they were built with British capital? Did the location of Russian railroads, financed by Germans and French, reinforce the cultural colonialism exemplified by St. Petersburg? Since the American South was from the outset colonial, its first major cities were seaboard cities oriented to the mother country, as were those in the North. That Charleston waned in size and importance while New Orleans rose was not a sign that the South was becoming less colonial, but rather that the South as a "colony" now (in part because of steam navigation up the Mississippi) had a larger hinterland.

When colonialism was thrown off and national independence won, or formerly colonial areas integrated into a larger whole in a less colonial way, some states did try hard to reorganize their system of cities with less external orientation. After the Bolshevik revolution and even more after World War II, the Soviet Union deliberately pursued a policy of heartland orientation for its city system, with Moscow rather than Leningrad as the capital. After China had what might be called her third nationalist revolution in 1949, during the operation of her first five year plan from 1955 to 1957, strong emphasis was placed on shifting China's balance and focus from seacoast to inland cities. Under Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalists and with their approval, the old treaty ports had continued to grow, especially between 1936 and 1953 because of the influx of refugees. The Communists forcibly set out to change this pattern, moving the capital from Nanking back to Peking, restructuring rail and air facilities so that there was more focus on Peking, and making Peking a major industrial center intended to overtake Shanghai in population.[52] In an early stage of the industrialization of the American South, the center of gravity of her cities began to

shift inland. For similar reasons, there has been some shift of population inland in Middle Eastern countries in recent years.[53]

On the other hand, some countries found it impossible or inexpedient to shift their capital inland. For example, in Southeast Asia many so-called independent new nations are in fact still economically and militarily dependent, and so their great port capitals persist as foci of national hinterlands in a still-colonial manner. It can be argued that America's primary city remained New York, on the seacoast, because the United States remained militarily and economically colonial to England during the 19th century; that the drift to Chicago at the end of the century reflected a lessening of our colonialism as well as Western settlement; but that the gravity pull reaffirmed emphasis on New York because of our new involvements in world trade and European finance. The long closure of Chinese markets to American trade may very well have helped—at least in a slight way—to keep more weight from shifting away from New York to Pacific Coast cities.

Obviously, in Africa or Southeast Asia, there is some conflict between a newly independent nation's political needs for inward orientation and its involvement with an increasingly interdependent network of international trade. Changes in shipping technology toward bigger and bigger oil tankers and container ships demanding bigger backup warehouse facilities tend to reinforce a seacoast emphasis. At Rotterdam and Antwerp and on the American Gulf Coast, more and more industries are locating at or near the waterfront. In terms of long-range economic interests, it may be as unwise for new nations to shift their urban emphasis inland as it was economically obsolete for some of them to divide up large land holdings into numerous independent ones in the name of "land reform."

Hierarchies of Capitals

Among the factors that have produced territorial cohesion and integration, economics, government, and culture have been inextricably intertwined. For pre-industrial cities, Gideon Sjoberg described the interrelationship in one conclusion too sweeping to be accurate: "Urban growth . . . is invariably highly correlated with the consolidation or extension of a . . . kingdom or an empire," which creates a stable base for trade. This permits, he said, a disproportionately large share of economic goods to funnel through the capital and from there into the hands of a dominant elite. This group in turn subsidizes the culture-creators and -bearers, who create the dominant ethos. The military and government are tied to local elites, remitting to them some of the surplus in exchange for their support.[54]

The case of Rome certainly lends some credence to this generalization. Italy, Lösch has written, lost her commanding position in the Roman Empire which

depended on wine and olive oil privileges (and therefore lost her political pre-eminence) when she gradually permitted the legions to supply themselves and when she gradually emancipated the provinces with respect to these and other important economic goods.[55] The generalization also applies to the new nations, where indigenous elites have stepped into the exploitive role formerly occupied by foreigners, and often into their former homes, and have continued to use the primate port cities as centers of economic exploitation and cultural dominance.[56]

However, throughout history the generalization has not uniformly held for political capitals and indeed Sjoberg did not imply that the great cities were invariably political capitals in the modern sense. Political capitals have often not enjoyed complete pre-eminence. Imperial Rome felt culturally humble toward Athens, and was outshone by Alexandria as an economic center. In the early Byzantine Empire, Constantinople had to struggle against Rome's sense of primacy and superiority, and to contend with the rivalry and jealousy of Antioch and Alexandria.[57] From 1506 onward, Seville, not Madrid, controlled all the Spanish overseas trade, and it remained more important than Madrid until the 17th century. Madrid has only recently surpassed Barcelona in population; for a long time Naples was the largest city in Italy, and not until the 1930s did Rome surpass Milan in population.[58] In England, Winchester was for a long time the financial center of the nucleus of the future nation, important even after the Conquest; Canterbury was the ecclesiastical center; and it was a long time before the kings settled down in Westminster.

In states that were not yet formed or were semi-inchoate, the capital was often peripatetic, being wherever the ruler was, as in the cases of the later Roman emperors or the Frankish rulers of Gaul.

Capitals have changed as polities have changed their orientations. From the 8th to the 10th centuries, the Arabs successively chose Medina, Damascus, Baghdad and Fustat as capitals. As primary centers, the Arabs preferred Damascus to Antioch, Cairo to Alexandria, Kairwan (in the desert plain 120 miles south of Tunis) to Carthage, because their main transport routes were overland. China had eighteen capitals.[59] In the 20th century, Peking was superseded by Nanking under the Nationalists and then restored again under the Communists. Kiev gave way to Moscow, Moscow to St. Petersburg, and Leningrad to Moscow again. Continuing rivalries between Leningrad and Moscow led to the latter's unnecessarily uncharitable treatment of the former during the great siege of World War II, even to the extent of forcing Leningrad to operate by Moscow time.[60] Trier on Moselle was the seat of the Roman praetorian prefecture of the Gauls in the late 3rd and 4th centuries, to be superseded by Arles at the beginning of the 5th century. Roman roads focused on Lyon and Rheims and only gradually was this focus changed to Paris.[61] In the 10th century when the Capets

were rising in the Île de France, Rheims was a greater ecclesiastical and cultural center. From 987 to about 1200, the seat of the Capets moved about from Senlis, Étampes, and then Orleans before settling in Paris. Lyon declined drastically "from its once central position in Roman Gaul, only to be restored to second capital status by 16th-century French kings. The ascendancy of Paris became apparent only when Francois I began an elaborate court life there."[62] Even so, national political life focused on Versailles in the late 17th and 18th centuries, as it focused on Westminster and not the city of London from the 18th century on in England, and on Potsdam rather than Berlin whenever German emperors willed it so.

Often capitals have been chosen not because of their centrality but because of their borderland locale, or because they marked a ballast point between two or more different regions united within one polity. Vaughn Cornish has called "forward capitals" those placed at dangerous frontier points or the edges of important economic regions: for example, Constantinople, selected by Constantine as a base from which to defend the Euphrates and Lower Danube frontiers. Or Peking, capital for the Mongols because it was the frontier between their territory and the Chinese, and for the Mings for reverse reasons. London was a border fortress against the Danes in Saxon times and a link with the Continent during the Middle Ages. Prague was a forward capital toward the regions of greatest menace to what much later was called Czechoslovakia. Ballast capitals have included Washington, D.C., between North and South in the U.S.; Madrid, in relation to the regions that became provinces in Spain; Ottawa, between English and French Canada; Brussels, near the borderline between Walloon and Flanders; or 16th-century Warsaw, as a compromise between the Polish capital of Cracow and the Lithuanian capital of Vilna. The balance of power was such in the late 1950s that Brussels and Strasbourg made good capitals for the European Economic Community. Perhaps some time this balance may shift again to make Aachen a more feasible center, back to the ballast point of Charlemagne.[63]

In federal systems, the administrative capital has been frequently other and much smaller than the economic capital, e.g., the Hague in relation to Amsterdam; Bern, to Zurich; Washington, to New York City; Lansing, to Detroit; Springfield, to Chicago; Sacramento, to San Francisco; and so forth. Sometimes central governmental functions have been divided up among several cities. For example, in the Union of South Africa, the legislature meets in Capetown, the judiciary in Bloemfontein, and the administration sits in Praetoria.

In the cases of Washington, Ottawa, the Hague, Madrid, and Canberra, among others, economics was not a major factor in the choice of capital. Also, capitals have often not been major cultural centers: for example, Bonn in present West Germany.

It is amply clear that Sjoberg's generalization does not apply to all cases, which leaves us still with the question of how political, economic, social and cultural integration has been fostered or not by cities. Changes in locale of capitals, or the presence of multiple centers, are valuable clues to changes in the overall structure of a polity, but an appropriate mode of analysis has not yet been developed, and we lack a comprehensive hypothesis.

McGee has written about Southeast Asian cities that the relationship of provincial towns to their surrounding countryside has been little investigated.[64] Too few studies have also been made of the relation between national or imperial capitals to the whole pattern of towns within their political orbit. The imperial governments of both China and Rome relied heavily on local administration by local urban elites (who were in fact landowners). In the case of China, the city as such was not a political unit but was simply part of an administrative territory.[65] On the other hand, a central part of the story of the Byzantine Empire centers around the process by which urban elites gradually shirked their duty, so that cities that had been autonomous political entities became districts under imperial officials. The huge volume of the empire's legislation designed to keep this from happening reminds us of E. B. White's comments about the British government's unsuccessful attempts to bolster the self-regulating functions of local guilds in the late Middle Ages—self-government at the king's command.[66]

There has been a wide spectrum of relationships between cities and their broader national and imperial governments. Sometimes, as in the early Roman Empire, they have been nearly autonomous city-states linking to the empire through their local elites. The corporate separateness of cities might have a territorial base, as it did for some medieval German cities or even more in North Italy, or it might be a nonterritorial set of privileges for a group of men forming an estate in the feudal and post-feudal system, as was the case in England.[67] In the Islamic world of the 7th century, cities were not unified entities at all but aggregates of semi-independent quarters. Rulers, merchants, and priests transcended locality and lived in an empire-wide cosmopolitan society,[68] and cities had neither territorial nor corporate autonomy.

In each case the position of cities in the process of social and political territorial integration would have been different, but there has been no general analytic comparative study of this.

We need to know more, too, about the changing balance of tensions between capitals and secondary capitals. All over Europe from the 17th century through the 19th century, primary centers grew at the expense of regional capitals. Yet the 17th and 18th centuries were a heyday for provincial centers. In France, each such city was the seat of nobility, of a provincial parliament, and of the provincial administration, and a cultural center, until the regional capitals

were robbed of their administrative functions when provinces were replaced by departments in 1789. In Norway and Yugoslavia today, regional centers continue to be important, partly because the countries are divided internally by natural barriers. In France, of course, the central government has taken measures to try to restore some of the former strength of provincial centers.[69] In China, too, official Communist policy has favored administrative and industrial decentralization (while all the while Peking grows, as the Paris region also continues growing). Evidence that the Chinese give more than lip service to their policy is the fact that in 1960, of the seventeen cities with more than a million people, eleven were provincial capitals.[70] In the United States, on the other hand, the number of federal agencies acting directly in major cities is so large, and the weight of federal policy-making through grants-in-aid so strong, that we scarcely have autonomous city governments any more. We may have regional economic capitals, but it is an open question how important our state capitals really are.

Cities and Social Integration

Karl Deutsch and others have suggested a variety of different ways to measure the integration of political communities. Social communication, Deutsch claims, has been the cement of nations, and can be measured by mail flow or telephone traffic. Decision-making patterns and networks of influence are also useful indicators. Although historians habitually use such measurements, they have not developed a systematic presentation of how these different kinds of spatial integration have appeared and changed over time.

Looking not at the whole pattern but simply at how the structure of certain social and economic institutions reflects or affects areal integration, historical evidence is more available, though it has not been marshaled in a thorough fashion around the broader theoretical issues involved.

The spatial reach of stable vocational associations plays some role in areal integration. That is, if vocational associations are very local, this may be an index of the absence of broad areal integration in more comprehensive socio-economic terms. In ancient China, for example, associations within city wards did not even extend throughout the whole city.[71] In the 1830s in the United States, as I have outlined in my book on the professions and government,[72] local professional associations, like local labor councils, were the characteristic mode of vocational organization at a time when railroads were just beginning to radiate into cities like spokes into the center of a wheel. When railroads cut broader east–west paths, providing the transportation rudiments for national integration, national and state professional associations appeared. Between 1890 and 1920, many professions improved their coordinations of local, state and national associations and began to mobilize in a practical fashion as pressure groups. In

a fairly lengthy series of oral history interviews with Teamsters Union leaders, I have also traced how the original aggregation of strongly autonomous, elitist, big-city-centered West Coast drayage locals were outflanked by Dave Beck, through the organizing of inland small towns, and welded into a relatively unified regional body. Ralph and Estelle James have described how Jimmy Hoffa was doing the same thing, playing one city against another, and using the leverage of Chicago as a major break-in-bulk center, to organize the over-the-road drivers in the central states and then in the South and East. The two sets of activities converged to build an integrated national organization which could negotiate worker's contracts on a regional and national basis, in turn making wages and working conditions more uniform over broader areas of space.[73]

The whole story need not be recounted here. The point is that gradually the professions, trade unions, and also trade associations were effectively organized on a national basis, so an elaborate spatially layered structure interwoven with public government superceded the old patterns of locally autonomous groups.

City organizations continued to be important distinct elements of the whole. National vocational integration built up from and through the cities, in contrast with the medieval Islamic world, where there were few, if any, strictly urban societies and where law societies and other associations cut across territory to embrace urban dwellers and villagers alike.[74]

In the United States wider areal integration of vocational associations was paralleled by wider areal integration in other spheres. In another study, on the relationships between the income tax policies of a state (California) and those of the federal government, I have described how tax policies have increasingly welded the various layers of American government together.[75] I have also traced the history of the relationship between local, state, and federal courts in the United States, how they have become more uniform and more integrated, where pluralism once prevailed.[76]

Recall what various people have written about the change from locally owned business in the United States to national corporations, and then the decentralization of assembly plants, so that local business owners found themselves jostled by a new, spatially mobile, gray-flannel-suited breed of salaried executives, whose suburban life styles William Whyte described. [Think also of the more recent trend toward retail outlets franchised with national brands.] Remember also the comments of the Lynds about the tendency of members of Middletown's owning class in the 1920s and 1930s to send their children away to school, or to go to Chicago or New York to buy clothes or attend the opera. Digby Baltzell has said that the children of the Philadelphia upper class formerly went to local schools, but by the 1940s were being sent to New England boarding schools and to eastern Ivy League universities, so that they could become part of a general regional elite.[77] [In time, elites from all over the world came to

be educated at such universities, as they had once gone to be educated at Oxford in England during the days of the British Empire.]

Because of the size of the United States and its ocean boundaries, the international thrust of this process was relatively belated. As reason and enthusiasm were two sides of the Enlightenment, so nationalism and internationalism were two sides of 19th-century Europe. There, at first kings and aristocrats, then industrialists and financiers, and later workingmen each had regularized international association with others of their own kind.

One explanation of fascism, both as found in Europe and in the United States, is that is was an attempt to reshape the pluralistic international thrusts into a nationally controlled framework. Vichy France was a fascinating collection of people with disparate spatial frames of reference, including not only intense nationalists but also some predecessors of today's Europe-oriented technocrats. President Charles de Gaulle understood very well how modern social organization had produced in France several different types of men whose reference groups were international or supranational. Perhaps that was why he proposed a Senate based on functional representation, better to harness these forces inside a national framework. He also understood the connection between these pressures and the need to alter France's system of cities, to decentralize industry, education, and government as a way of easing away from Paris the focus of discontents without really giving up nationally centralized control. On the other hand, by inviting NATO to take its headquarters away from Paris and by discouraging some American companies from building plants in France, he in effect helped to encourage other-than-French cities as the nodes of European-wide activities and organization, possibly to the ultimate detriment of France.

The thrust of American industry and trade union organization into Canada has webbed the two nations together. [In reaction, the Canadian Auto Workers later seceded from the American United Auto Workers.] As for the United States and Europe, in recent decades multinational corporations, international professional associations and labor unions, and various other activities and institutions have been adumbrating a new process of integration across the present boundaries of the American nation-state.

The question is, how have cities been transformed by shifting patterns of social integration involving new pluralisms of space, in turn linked to changing political integration? The range of possible answers is too extensive to be mapped in brief compass. All I can do is to suggest a few kinds of city-reactions out of the many that should be explored.

Systemic changes in social integration at the macro-level entail shifts in the social use of space within cities, because residential spatial segregation has long been a device for social differentiation. Neither the European Jewish ghetto nor the American black ghetto was a unique phenomenon. Throughout most of

history and in most parts of the world, cities have been divided into wards. Sometimes kinship, ethnic or village origins were the prevailing criteria of ward membership; sometimes wards were enclaves of a particular social class or vocational group. In Nigeria, old quarters centered around chiefs.[78] In early China and the Middle East, each ward or quarter had its own walls and gate. In neither case was there a general city law or charter. In Mamluk Syria, each quarter had its own police, tax collection and defense. Medieval European wards and more recent French arrondissements had some self-governing powers. In the later Roman Empire, on the other hand, ward government in the city of Rome became part of the imperial government.[79]

Systems of urban spatial segregation have been used to reinforce social differences that in turn have been the basic elements of the economic system. If ancient professions tended to aggregate by quarters to build a sense of social community which in turn facilitated practice of the vocation, the same process may be at work in a more indirect way when American business and professional elites today isolate themselves residentially. If so, racial-residential desegregation implies and possibly requires a comparable mix in the upper echelons of business. Conversely, it may be that American blacks cannot at the same time move up the corporate ladder and cling to black nationalist social and residential communities.

Major changes in urban spatial pattern both reflect and effect changes in the other realms. So do changes in the relationships between the city proper and its surrounding suburbs. History affords us several vivid examples: Louis Napoleon's annexation of the ring of communes around Paris was a way of trying to maintain control over their worker-residents. When Asian and African countries won their independence, indigenous people moved both into the jobs and the quarters formerly occupied by colonial foreigners. One of the first official acts of the Bolshevik revolution was to move workers from their slum suburbs in Moscow to former bourgeois and upper-class homes near the city center.[80] Samuel P. Hays has demonstrated that the transformation of American city wards, in the name of Progressive reform, was the work of professional and business groups whose activities had given them a broader geographic frame of reference and base of power.[81] In the 1960s in New York City and Detroit, decentralization of school administration was a device by which inner-city black residents attempted to restore some of the old ward organization as a way of counteracting the white man's broader spatial power.

When trade has been extrinsic rather than intrinsic to the total system, special urban areas have been set aside for long-distance traders. Chinese, Arabs, and Africans quarantined trade outside the walls of cities. Most foreign trade was confined to the edges of the Chinese empire, where it could do the least harm to the social fabric.[82] Industry and trade lay outside the theoretical

province of Greek cities, so trade was done by *metics.* It was a major social transformation, as well as a major change in urban history, when wandering merchants settled down, and when merchants became the ruling urban class. Sometimes, to free trade from the entanglements of social integration based on non-trade premises, mercantile city-states were necessary. To be what it was, seventeenth-century Amsterdam had to be an almost-independent city-state. Recently Singapore felt it must make itself a city-state for similar reasons. Out of free ports eventually come new patterns of integration.

New Urban Directions

In 1956, J.R.P. Friedmann argued that, "As economic development proceeds, the degree of areal specialization, functional differentiation and spatial interaction between different regions increases. As a result, the economy's spatial structure develops from one characterized by small, isolated, and functionally undifferentiated communities, into a hierarchy of interdependent regions, this giving way at the highest stages of development to more or less 'autonomous' linear cities and conurbations of very large proportions."[83]

Related to this pattern is the recent trend toward decentralization. Manufacturing companies that formerly were concentrated in special locations near raw materials have been decentralizing to be near cheaper labor or closer to markets or both. Since long-haul rates have been rising faster than short-haul rates and railroads have to compete with trucks on the short haul, and because rail rates on finished products have risen faster than those on raw products, firms build plants closer to consumers. Since truck freight rates climb steeply with distance, products are shipped to the nearest port rather than being routed through New York, another decentralizing factor. New York has been losing transport-sensitive industry since 1929.[84]

Urban industry now tends to be diversified rather than specialized in function. Wilbur Thompson has argued that with greater urban size there is a greater tendency toward local self-sufficiency because the local service sector rises in relative importance and the export sector relatively declines.[85] Therefore, the forms of national integration fostered by 19th- and early 20th-century urban specialization may be changing. Does urban self-sufficiency imply that the process of integration with broader regions, currently helping to decimate American city centers and render obsolete some forms of local governmental structure, will in the long run be reversed so that government focus can become polynuclear once more?

Economic thinking has for a long time remained in the grip of mercantilist assumptions of a spatial region (the state) competing to sell more than it buys. Urban economists have applied the same kind of concept to their analysis of urban regions. A basic industry, in their view, is one that produces for export.

Economic geographers have distinguished between producer towns and consumer towns, examples of the latter being court towns of the 17th century in Europe, bishops' sees in the early European Middle Ages, American university towns in the 19th and early 20th century, and so forth, although in fact all these produced services, consumed mainly by people in or from other places, and so were basic or producer centers just as much as manufacturing towns were.[86]

For the United States, perhaps such characteristically 19th-century dichotomies (like the distinction between work and play) are no longer relevant. Wilbur Thompson contends that major cities continually attract new industries in their early stages of innovation and fast growth and spin off aging industries to small towns where labor is cheaper and less skilled. Therefore, the true economic base of the great city region is the "creativity of its universities and research parks, the sophistication of its engineering firms and financial institutions, the persuasiveness of its public relations and advertising agencies, and the other dimensions of infrastructure that facilitate the quick and orderly transfer from old dying bases to new growing ones."[87] What was formerly thought of as consumption is now the very heart of production. Or, since large city complexes consume more and more of what they produce, perhaps it is all consumption.

The increasing importance of consumption for location is changing the urban landscape, in the drift of population to areas of amenity: to the Riviera; to Florida, Arizona and California; to special cities for recreation and retirement; and sometimes back to restored historic sections of big cities.

When the relation of labor costs to total production costs is high, there may be in the long run no incentive for industry to move away from conurbations to small towns if unions are able to impose area-wide contracts which eliminate local wage differentials.

Finally, mention should be made of urban sprawl, the trend toward multinuclear cities. If the sprawl becomes extensive enough, it might seem like the European medieval urban world, where towns on important traffic routes were often no more than eight miles apart, or Arab urban agglomerations where city wards blurred into suburban quarters that blurred into rural villages without clearcut distinctions.

Much of our thinking about cities and about political form dates from a time when none of the above conditions was present. Perhaps the world may become all city and no state.

City Systems Changes and Political Revolution

Today's changes in overall integration are relatively peaceable. In the past, sometimes the adjustments have been more violent. No one, so far as I know, has done a comprehensive and systematic historical study of how changes in urban structure have created a climate for revolution, despite the influence of

the Marxian expectation that revolutions would come from urban proletariats. Berlin had been booming in population before the revolt that resulted in the Weimar Republic; the Bolshevik revolution was preceded for some decades by rapid urban growth in Russia. In the cases of Germany and Russia, urban growth was closely linked to industrialization. China's urban growth from the 1930s on had much in common with the so-called over-urbanization of Third World cities since the end of World War II. People moved to cities not because jobs were there but rather because means of sustenance were lacking in the country. Is this pattern in Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East today a prelude to new revolts? Each major revolution has been followed by shifts in urban population. Lyon suddenly dropped in population after the 1789 French Revolution, while the population of other French cities rose. After 1917 in Russia, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa and ports in general, and cities in the agricultural parts of the Northern Ukraine and the western edge of European Russia all dropped drastically in population, while engineering and oil cities gained, as did Kharkov, capital of the Soviet Ukraine.[88] The reciprocal effects of cities and revolutions need to be analyzed comparatively, taking into account all the complex interacting factors I have been sketching here.

The Role of the Church in City Systems

A social science kind of analytic should also be applied to the history of church structures as it affected and was affected by changing urban patterns.

Although Diocletian's supra-urban bureaucratic and administrative divisions of the Empire heavily influenced the government of the Roman Catholic Church, cities were the basic governmental units when the church took its initial bearings, and so for a long time the election of the pope and the composition of the College of Cardinals reflected the Church's local urban origins—the pope was the bishop of Rome.

As we know, continuity at the sites of Roman cities from the 6th through the 10th centuries depended on the persistence of bishops' sees. Bishops won from emperors grants of temporal power over their towns. Some of the medieval new town foundings were sponsored by ecclesiastical lords. In the 11th and 12th centuries, townsmen in turn revolted against the bishops. Towns became special places with a unique legal status in large part because of their religious heritage.

Urban history and church history have been intertwined right down to modern times. Medieval European town social life and government revolved around parishes and dioceses. This heritage is still vividly apparent in English and Louisiana governmental divisions as well as other places.

The history of the Church is also an integral part of urban economic history. From the late 14th century to the end of the 15th century (with 1460 as the end of the time of greatest vitality), the Medicis owed much of their great

influence in "international" interurban finance to the fact that their main client was the Curia. Italian banks transmitting ecclesiastical revenues had agents in France, Flanders, and England, from the 13th century on. French and English concern about this drainage of bullion to Avignon and Rome hastened the formation of independent states.[89] For a larger view of the relation of cities to polities, note should also be taken of how urban responses to the teachings of Luther were played upon by princes interested in solidifying their own territorial states.

Cities, Universalism, and Particularism

In a more sociological and ideological sense, the history of religions of the book is urban history. Both Christianity and Islam made their first major converts among urban non-elites.[90] The universalism in these religions was a useful spatial counter-lever against the locally rooted power base of urban landowning aristocracies, whose ascendancy was reinforced by localistic gods. Religion has been a factor in the process of integration readjustments, as well as a force for general cohesion.

There are many unexplored analogies between the role of religion and the role of nationalism in territorial power struggles. It is a cliché to say that nationalism (as distinguished from stateism) comes with industrialism and urbanism. When England emerged as a clearcut national state under the Tudors in the 16th century, woolen manufacture had become mechanized to such a degree that industries were moving into East Anglia, Yorkshire, and the West Country (i.e., the heartland), looking for suitable streams. The Bolshevik revolution came not only because a war had made arms available to the masses and disrupted normal patterns, but also because Russian industrialization and urbanization had reached a stage that required major readjustments of the socio-political structure. After the disruptions of the revolution were over, industrialization and urbanization proceeded even faster, together with major shifts to the heartland and major attempts to homogenize the population culturally, despite an ideology which sanctioned spatial-cultural pluralism. Although the Nazis glorified the farmer, were ideologically anti-bourgeois and anti-urban, and underwrote ancient German particularistic traditions, they too wittingly or unwittingly fostered spectacular urban growth and industrialization, even during 1932 and 1934.[91]

Although, as Carlton Hayes and others have demonstrated, there were many kinds of nationalists in Europe (some liberal, some conservative, some humanitarian, some pioneers of fascism), most of the politically active nationalists were of the urban middle class.[92] Shafer described nationalism as a byproduct of urbanism: "Nationalism not only made possible collaboration between eco-

nomic classes but provided an outlet for group and individual frustration as rising urbanism and industrialism shattered old authorities.[93] With the added factor of vehement reaction against colonialism, Chinese nationalism followed much the same course as European nationalism. So did nationalism in Southeast Asia, Africa, Turkey, Arab countries, and Latin America—though there have been some exceptions.[94]

For urban historians, nationalism is best understood as one facet of the play of particularism against universalism, universalism against particularism—used against each other by conflicting segments of the social structure—that explains so much of the history of the world.

Imperial China, imperial Rome, and Catholic Rome all claimed a certain kind of universal jurisdiction. With their mandate from heaven, Chinese emperors assumed they were mother and father of all mankind, a presumption not so different from that of the popes.[95] When Chinese Communism appealed to Marxist principles, it was also universalistic. Marxist universalism in turn inherited some of the universalism of the Enlightenment; Marxism has also had the Enlightenment's peculiar and seemingly contradictory tendency to lend itself to nationalism (i.e., particularism). Add to the situation the fact that nationalist revolutionaries are often urban cosmopolitans. In Southeast Asia the members of the governing elite are sometimes the most westernized indigenous people. Such people seem to be more interested in overseas education for their children and overseas travel for themselves than in the problems of their own countrymen.[96]

In the Nazi version of nationalism, the locality was a microcosm of the nation; for the Chinese Communists the nation was a macrocosm, composed of local elements. Despite Mao's emphasis on rural communes, the whole ideology was essentially urban. In the 1920s most or all of the Communists were in cities. By 1948 Mao Tse Tung considered the cities to be the center of gravity of the movement. Most of the post-1949 Communist elite were recruited from the urban middle class. Up through the middle 1950s, the party relied on the urban classes for party members and officials, while trying to transform consumer cities into producer cities.[97] In 1957, the emphasis of Communist policy shifted, to recruit more peasants into the party and government. More than 20 million people were sent back from cities to the country. Much was made of the fact that urban elites had traditionally been the ruling class. The communes of the 1950s were designed to replace large urban agglomerations with a network of small towns. The communes did not work, of course, at least in their initial form, and by 1960 the urban, as well as rural, economy was in a shambles.[98] Nevertheless, anti-urbanism became, for a while, part of Mao's ideological arsenal. An interesting comparison might be made between this and 19th-century German and American anti-urbanism, which also accompanied industrialism, urbanism, and nationalism. Rural areas stood for virtue, said Mao; cities were corrupt.

In the early days after the Bolshevik revolution, the new rulers of the USSR adopted the Marxian aim of eliminating the differences between cities and villages (an aim not accomplished yet). By 1969, 60 per cent of the Soviet people lived in cities, and more than 30 per cent in cities of over 100,000. Today, Soviet urban specialists have accepted the urban way of life as a prototype for the rest of society and they seem to be assuming that there is a universal urban culture, though they still believe that a distinctly socialist form of city can be maintained.[99]

In China's changing policies toward cities and changing uses of urban imagery can be traced a shifting territorial tactic from Marxist universalism to nationalism to would-be alliance with other Third World countries. As one writer has summed it up: "Thus the doctrine of 'just wars,' which should be supported by the world communist movement as a whole, grew into the doctrine of 'national liberation wars,' which the Chinese would support separately from or even against the Soviets, and finally into the doctrine that the underdeveloped countries correspond to the 'rural areas of the world,' which by following Mao's principles can surround and overcome the 'cities of the world'."[100]

Cities as Paradigms and Symbol Systems, Cities and Values

The most salient aspects of national or imperial values and socioeconomic structure are notated in city form, especially in certain world cities. Cities are paradigms; they are symbol systems. As such, they must be understood and experienced aesthetically. The aesthetic dimension, ineffable as it is, cannot be left out.

Lewis Mumford demonstrated this in his caustic analysis of classical baroque as it evolved from 17th-century Versailles through Baron Haussmann's mid-19th century Paris—the avenue, uniform facades, the Étoile, the emphasis on movement and power over space. Railroads and freeways have continued the baroque spirit. It is interesting to see how many concessions Louis Napoleon made to 19th-century bourgeois values: a city organized for comfort, middle- class pleasure, and cleanliness, control over the working class, ease of bourgeois movement, and ease of exchange. Perhaps even more important is how Second Empire Paris was designed to dramatize a power that Napoleon III did not have or was shortly about to lose. Paris was built as a great visual and control center; the Third Republic was localistic.[101] Minerva not only flies at dusk but also on the fuel of wishful thinking. Aristocratic Georgian London was built at a time when the day of aristocratic dominance was almost gone.

Imperial China built its cities quite consciously and deliberately as symbol systems [See Chapter 9]. City walls were supposed to be square, emblems of an ordered society under heaven in controlled harmony with nature. Each wall stood for a different color, season, and time of day, which in turn represented different

elements and qualities. Social gradations within the city were expressed by gradations in size and color. Peking was gray toward the outer edges and more and more brilliant in color as one approached the heart where the emperor lived; low houses were on the outer edges, palaces on the three-tiered platforms in the center. The base of Chinese society was the family unit, so the city was like a house. One entered both house and city ceremoniously; different people came and left the city by different gates for different ritual purposes.[102]

When the Communists moved their capital back to Peking, home of the emperors, they preserved and restored the historic imperial buildings but made them public, not private. The symbolic heart of the city was no longer the emperor's home, the former tangent point between human society and the rest of the cosmos, but rather Tienanmen Square, with its monument to the immortal people's heroes and its great spaces for mass meetings on May Day.

Perhaps the most important change was the removal of the city walls. "One should get around more," Premier Chou En-Lai once said to a deputy chairman of the U.S.S.R. Presidium. "Bureaucratism will develop if one always stays in Peking. The high city walls of Peking are likely to separate the leadership from the masses." Jokingly the Russian said, "These city walls have their advantages, too. They keep bureaucracy within bounds." "There's still another advantage," quipped Premier Chou En-Lai. "If people oppose the bureaucracy, the city walls will keep them off for a time. But they cannot be a certain guarantee. Walls can be breached . . . If we don't change our bureaucratic ways, some day they will break through the walls."[103] By 1966 the administration itself had torn most of the walls down.[104]

The debate over architecture and urban form was particularly intense in 1920s Germany. Some saw the International style appearing in Berlin's suburbs as a vehicle for a mass society, technology, science, socialism, and internationalism— all of which were equated with urbanism. Relieving the housewife of kitchen and cleaning drudgery, the new architecture might lead to a breakdown of the German family. Critics wanted, instead, a return to the soil, to family, to the German folk tradition. Wrote one man in 1932: "The new dwelling is an instrument for the destruction of the family and the race."[105]

Official Nazi policy was against the Bauhaus styles and against cities. The Nazis wanted to "reincorporate metropolitan populations into the rhythm of the German landscape."[106] Hitler, like Bismarck, disliked Berlin and thought it was degenerate. Nevertheless he said, "Without the city of Rome there would never have been a Roman Empire." He expected Berlin to grow to ten million and be the biggest city of Europe. As the new Rome, capital of The Thousand Years Reich, Berlin (to be renamed Germania) was to focus on a giant building domed like St. Peter's. (Hitler thought to steal the symbolic fire of the Roman Catholic Church for his own purposes.) The square in front of the building was

to be broader than the Place de la Concorde; leading into the square was to be a new avenue, grander than the Champs Élyseés. "This avenue," writes Albert Speer, "was meant to spell out in architecture the political, military and economic power of Germany."[107]

The architectural changes of the 1920s embodied the spirit of the new science and technology in which Germany was a leader and through which Germany might have dominated a neotechnic world. Hitler's idea of power was more old-fashioned. Not only Rome, but also Versailles and Napoleon, had put constraints on imagination. It is interesting to contemplate what might have happened if Hitler had visualized Berlin in the image of New York.

The subject of urban symbols and values is too big to be covered in the space at my disposal. I shall have to content myself with one concluding comment: Perceptions of urban form intimately relate to perceptions of the form and position of the polity. When there were no national boundaries, city boundaries were all important—the walled city was a haven. Much modern his-tory has been the story of the moving of city walls, either actually or figuratively, until they enclosed a whole national territory rather than just an individual city. Though Paris exchanged its walls for boulevards, France built a Maginot line. International relations in the past several decades have been dominated by a "wall" mentality: the Iron Curtain, Korea, the Berlin wall, and Vietnam as walls of containment, and a wall of missile bases. Old urban notions still rule our perception of the world.

Conclusion

There are many other factors I have not presented here. For example, the influence of aggregate growth; or, the pluralistic structure of spatial-temporal perceptions, seen through the eyes of all the actors involved. The problem for historians, as I see it, is how to weld all these elements together, doing full justice to the qualitative differences in each, how to give with sensitivity and precision a multi-dimensional explanation of change that will yield more insight.